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I. INTRODUCTION
High school dropouts form a disturbingly large minority of their
age-group population. From 1986 to 1990, between 4,535 and 4,725
West Virginia pupils dropped out of school each year while between
21,824 and 22,886 graduated.' Nationally, only 71% of public high
school students graduated in 1989, which leads to the disquieting
realization that one in every four students fail to complete their
education. 2
Significant concrete effects, such as higher unemployment rates
and lower earnings, result from persons dropping out of school. For
the period of 1987 to 1990, across the nation dropouts confronted
an unemployment rate over twice that of high school graduates.3
Further, even when employed, dropouts earn less than high school
graduates: from 1987 to 1989, dropouts made approximately one-
fourth less than did persons finishing school. 4
1. Memoranda from the West Virginia Department of Education (on file with Bob Boggs,
Attendance Coordinator for the West Virginia Department of Education).
2. Telephone Interview with Richard Whalen, Statistician, Office for Educational Research
and Improvement, United States Department of Education (Aug. 19, 1991).
3. Telephone Interview with Thomas Nardone, Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Department
of Labor (Aug. 26, 1991). The following unemployment rates for high school graduates and dropouts
were determined for the month of October each year:
H.S. Graduates Dropouts
Oct. 1990 15.7% 32.3%
Oct. 1989 12.2% 28.0%
Oct. 1988 13.5% 28.7%
Oct. 1987 15.5% 37.8%
4. Telephone Interview with Chuck Nelson, Chief of Income Statistics for the Bureau of the
Census (Aug. 26, 1991). For persons 25 years of age and older, the median earnings per year for
high school graduates and dropouts were:
H.S. Graduates Dropouts
1989 $16,777 $12,018
1988 $16,205 $11,613
1987 $15,605 $11,842
2
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In 1988, in an attempt to boost school attendance, 5 West Virginia
passed a statute conditioning successful application for a driver's
license on continued high school attendance as well as providing for
its revocation if the student withdraws. 6 A driver's license is an en-
titlement, and its revocation, therefore, demands provision of due
process to the individual involved.7 A recent West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals decision, Means v. Sidiropofis,8 considers this con-
stitutional issue.
This Note deals primarily with the constitutionality and effec-
tiveness of the statute. In order to thoroughly consider these ques-
tions, the statute itself will first be reviewed. Second, the majority
and dissenting opinion of Means will receive comprehensive treat-
ment. Third, procedural due process requirements for license rev-
ocation in general will be discussed. Fourth, these general,
precedential requirements will be applied to Means. Fifth, this ap-
plication of precedent will be compared to the majority and dis-
senting opinions' handling of the procedural due process issue. Sixth,
similar statutes from other jurisdictions will be examined. Seventh,
the findings of two Rutgers University professors in their report on
the statute will be laid out. Lastly, constitutionally required revisions
will be set forth and the statute's overall utility considered.
II. TiE WEST VIRGINIA STATUTE: CONDITIONING THE POSSESSION
OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE ON SCHOOL ATTENDANCE9
The statute provides that the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) will deny an automobile license or permit to anyone under
the age of eighteen who is (1) not enrolled in high school nor holding
a high school diploma; (2) not enrolled in a general education de-
velopment (GED) course nor holding a GED certificate; and (3) not
excused because of circumstances beyond her control.10 The legis-
5. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447 (W. Va. 1990).
6. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
7. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
8. 401 S.E.2d 447.
9. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
10. Id.
3
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lature enacted the statute in an attempt to encourage school atten-
dance."1
The procedural aspect of the statute originates with the school's
chief administrator who keeps track of student attendance 12 and pro-
vides the student with documentation of her enrollment status upon
application for a license. Upon a student's withdrawal from school,
the administrator contacts the DMV. 3 In turn, the DMV notifies
the student that her license will be suspended within thirty days
unless it receives documentation that the student has fulfilled the
statutory requirements.14 The statute defines withdrawal as "more
than ten consecutive or fifteen days total unexcused absences during
a single semester."' 5 If the student withdraws because of circum-
stances beyond her control, the school district superintendent ex-
empts her from the statute's provisions.16 Further, the school district
superintendent, with the assistance of other school officials, "shall
be the sole judge of whether such withdrawal is due to circumstances
beyond the control of such person.' 1 7 When the DMV suspends the
student's license, West Virginia Code Section 17B-3-618 provides that
the DMV will inform the aggrieved individual of her right to a
hearing upon request. The hearing will take place within twenty days
after receipt of such a request.19
III. MEANS V. SIDn oPOL s20
A. Background
Michael Means appealed to West Virginia's Supreme Court of
Appeals after the Circuit Court of Kanawha County upheld the
11. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 450 (,V. Va. 1990).
12. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. W. VA. CODE § 17B-3-6(10) (1991).
19. Id.
20. 401 S.E.2d 447 (W. Va. 1990). Christopher S. Butch, Charleston, represented Mr. Michael
Allen Means; Attorney General Roger W. Tompkins, Deputy Attorney General Bruce Ray Walker,
Assistant Attorney General Paul E. Jordan, Charleston, represented Mr. George T. Sidiropolis, Com-
missioner, West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.
[Vol. 94
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DMV's suspension of his driver's license. 2t At the time of appeal,
Mr. Means had attained the age of eighteen and, therefore, West
Virginia Code Section 18-8-11 no longer applied. 22 Nevertheless, the
Court heard Mr. Means' case because it "presents an issue 'which
may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape[s] review
at the appellate level because of [its] fleeting and determinate na-
ture."'3
To obtain employment and financially provide for his pregnant
wife,24 Mr. Means withdrew from school under the authority of West
Virginia Code Section 18-8-1.25 At the time of his withdrawal, Mr.
Means possessed a valid West Virginia driver's license. The DMV's
Student Attendance Program sent Mr. Means a "Notice of Sus-
pension" on January 10, 1989.2 After notifying him that his license
would be suspended on February 11, 1989, the DMV cited West
Virginia Code Section 17B-3-6(10) 27 and informed Mr. Means that
the suspension would occur because he was under eighteen and had
withdrawn from school. 28 The notice also advised him of his right
to a hearing. 29 After receiving Mr. Means' request for a hearing on
January 19, 1989, the Department notified him that although it had
arranged for a hearing on January 31, 1989, the Commissioner had
postponed it and would subsequently inform him of the new date.30
Not until April 21, 1989 did the DMV hear Mr. Means' case. 3t
Once convened, the subject of the hearing focused on only two
21. Id. at 449.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Israel v. Secondary Schools Act Comm'n, 388 S.E.2d 480, 483 (W. Va. 1989)).
24. Paul Marcotte, School Incentive, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 21.
25. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Supp. 1991) provides: "Compulsory school attendance shall begin
with the school year in which the sixth birthday is reached prior to the first day of September of
such year or upon enrolling in a publicly supported kindergarten program and continue to the sixteenth
birthday."
26. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 449 (W. Va. 1990).
27. W. VA. CODE § 17B-3-6 (1989) provides:
The department is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur
without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that
the licensee: ... (10) Is under the age of eighteen and has withdrawn either voluntarily or
involuntarily from a secondary school, as provided in section eleven [§ 18-8-11], article
eight, chapter eighteen of this code.
28. Means, 401 S.E.2d at 449.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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elements: (1) whether Mr. Means was less than eighteen, and (2)
whether he had withdrawn from school, either voluntarily or in-
voluntarily. 32
On May 31, 1989, the Commissioner sent Mr. Means notice that
his license was to be suspended, effective June 2, 1989, until he
turned eighteen or until he conformed with the statutory guidelines. 33
Apprising Mr. Means of his decision on April 21, 1989, the Com-
missioner pointed out that .'the law, as contained in W. Va. Code
§ 18-8-11(D) contemplates that the school superintendent (and those
who assist him) be the sole judge of whether a student who has
withdrawn from school should be accorded an exemption from com-
plying with the provisions of W. Va. Code § 18-8-11."'m The Com-
missioner went on to say that since he had no appellate jurisdiction
over the superintendent, he could not decide whether Mr. Means
should be exempted from the statute's requirements.35
Mr. Means appealed first to the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County. 36 Limiting its focus to the conditioning of a student driver's
license on school attendance, the court failed to address whether the
procedure followed by the school superintendent in designating Mr.
Means' withdrawal was within his control.37 The court determined
that (1) school enrollment as a condition of possessing a driver's
license was constitutional, and (2) the hearing conducted by the De-
partment's examiner satisfied the requirements of due process.3 8 Mr.
Means next appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 449-50. Although the Commissioner provided Mr. Means with a hearing prior to
suspension, W. VA. CODE § 17B-3-6 (1989) specifically provides that the DMV has authority to suspend
a driver's license without a preliminary hearing:
The department is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur
without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that
the licensee: ... (10) Is under the age of eighteen and has withdrawn either voluntarily or
involuntarily from a secondary school, as provided in section eleven [§ 18-8-11], article
eight, chapter eighteen of this code.
34. Id. (quoting the Commissioner).
35. Id. at 450.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
[Vol. 94
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B. The Majority Opinion By Justice Neely
Justice Neely divides his opinion into three separate discussions:
(1) whether the statute provides adequate guidelines by which a court
can determine if the school official has reasonably exercised her
discretion; 39 (2) whether the statute is constitutional (the means cho-
sen to accomplish the public purpose of increased school attendance
must bear a rational relation to this end);4° and (3) whether the
hearing provided by the state meets the requirements of due process.4'
1. Whether the Statute Provides Adequate Guidelines for the
Court's or the School Official's Determination
Mr. Means contends that the statute fails to establish satisfactory
standards by which to measure the reasonableness of the school
official's discretion. 42 In response, Justice Neely asserts that "the
words 'circumstances beyond their control' 43 create a quite specific
standard." 44 Analogizing this phrase to the phrase "reasonable
doubt" used in criminal cases, Justice Neely asserts that further
definitions of such phrases "are useless" and probably would con-
fuse more than clarify.45 Justice Neely cites several examples of
'"circumstances beyond their control":
children who withdraw from school because they are needed to support their
families; children who withdraw from school because of physical disabilities that
preclude further attendance between the ages of sixteen and eighteen; and, children
who withdraw from school because both the children and the schools agree that
further attendance will be less beneficial than on-the-job training or some other
program of personal development."
39. Id. 450-51.
40. Id. at 451-52.
41. Id. at 453.
42. Id. at 450.
43. Although Justice Neely quotes the statute in this manner, the statute actually employs the
language, "circumstances beyond his or her control" and "circumstances beyond the control of such
person." W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
44. Id. at 451.
45. Id. at 451, n.I.
46. Id. at 451.
7
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2. Whether the West Virginia Statute is Rationally Related to
Encouraging School Attendance
Since Means involves neither a suspect classification 7 nor a fun-
damental right, 48 Justice Neely finds that the "reasonable relation-
ship" test49 constitutes the appropriate standard of constitutional
review. The statute satisfies the reasonable relationship test if the
means (the revocation of a student's license upon withdrawal from
school) rationally relates to the end (encouraging school atten-
dance). 50 To address this issue, Justice Neely first examines Mr.
Means' contentions that (1) school attendance and driver's licenses
are not rationally related, and (2) in order for the rational rela-
tionship test to be satisfied, the legislature should have enacted a
statute raising the age of compulsory attendance to eighteen. 5'
Regarding the first prong of Mr. Means' charge, Justice Neely
attempts to justify the statute by maintaining that "a child who has
a driver's license but is not meaningfully employed during the day
by attending school or working at a serious job, has a higher like-
lihood than children so occupied of being out and about making
mischief with his or her car." 52 This rationale, however, only ex-
plains how forfeiture of a student driver's license rationally relates
to the goal of preventing minors from causing "mischief" when they
are not in school. This argument fails to explain how the license
revocation will encourage school attendance.
Addressing the second prong of Mr. Means' argument, Justice
Neely reasons that compulsory school attendance until the age of
eighteen creates the problem that "children would remain in school
who are not suited by disposition to the school environment and
senior high schools would face far more disciplinary problems than
they face now." ' 53 Thus, the statute provides a compromise solution
permitting "the peaceful departure of those students who will profit
47. Id.
48. Id. at 451 n.2.
49. Id. at 451.
50. Id. at 450.
51. Id. at 451-52.
52. Id. at 452.
53. Id.
[Vol. 94
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not at all from continuing formal education, allowing, then, the
schools to protect from disruptive influences the students who want
to learn. ' 54 Furthermore, the statute provides a third group of stu-
dents, who may not want to learn but who would nevertheless profit
somewhat from further education, with the incentive to overcome
"peer pressure" and continue their education. 55
3. Whether the Hearing Provided by the State Meets the
Requirements of Due Process
Justice Neely "disagree[d] with the circuit court that the hearing
mechanism applied in this case was appropriate. ' 56 Mr. Means' hear-
ing fell short of due process requirements because a hearing examiner
appointed by the Commissioner of the DMV heard his case rather
than the appropriate party, a school official:
The ultimate judge of whether a person has withdrawn 'due to circumstances
beyond the control of such person' is the superintendent, his delegate or the
appropriate school official of any private secondary school, so it becomes only
reasonable that the hearing should be held before the responsible public or private
school official.
... [The Department should inform students at the time it notifies them
that their licenses will be suspended that they have a right to a hearing before
the appropriate school official.-
Thus, Justice Neely concludes that the statute provides adequate
guidelines with which to determine the reasonableness of the school
official's decision. Moreover, the goal of encouraging school at-
tendance rationally relates to the means of student driver's license
revocation.5 9 However, finding the hearing provided by the state to
be inappropriate, Justice Neely held that the hearing should take
place before a school official. 60
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 450.
57. Id. at 453.
58. Id. at 451.
59. Id. at 452.
60. Id. at 453.
9
Merrill: The West Virginia Statute Conditioning Possession of a Student Dr
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
C. The Dissenting Opinion By Justice McHugh61
Justice McHugh disagrees with Justice Neely in two major areas.
First, Justice McHugh charges that the statute is unconstitutional
because it fails to provide a hearing prior to revocation. 62 Second,
because the statute fails to define the phrase "circumstances beyond
the control" of the student, it is void for vagueness.63 These failures
render the statute invalid. 64
1. The Absence of a Presuspension Hearing as a Violation
of Procedural Due Process
Citing relevant portions of the West Virginia Code, Justice
McHugh first observes that "procedural due process is required in
administrative proceedings." 65 Furthermore, "the United States Su-
preme Court has articulated the view that before a driver[']s license
may even be suspended, procedural due process is required."" In
direct conflict with this constitutional mandate, the state provides
no opportunity for the individual to be heard before her license is
revoked. 67 Justice McHugh points out that under the statute the
school superintendent notifies the DMV of the student's withdrawal
if she determines the withdrawal to be beyond the student's control.68
At this point, the DMV hears the case, but the hearing focuses solely
on whether the student is under eighteen and has withdrawn from
school. 69 As a reult, "at no point does the student have an op-
portunity to demonstrate to either the superintendent or the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles that the circumstances for withdrawal
are beyond his or her control." ' 70
Justice McHugh observes that Justice Neely attempts "to save
the statute from a constitutional failure" by judicially amending it. 71
61. Justice Miller joins Justice McHugh in this dissent. Id. at 457 (McHugh, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 455.
63. Id. at 455-56.
64. Id. at 456.
65. Id. at 453.
66. Id. at 455.
67. Id. at 453-54.
68. Id. at 454.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
[Vol. 94
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss2/6
1991-92] DRIVER'S LICENSE AND SCHOOL A7TENDANCE
Justice Neely held that (1) the hearing should be conducted by a
school official, and (2) the DMV should inform the student of her
"right to a hearing before the appropriate school official. ' 72 How-
ever, Justice McHugh criticizes Justice Neely's creation of these non-
legislative amendments on the ground that Justice Neely "fails to
articulate any specific procedure that the Department must follow
so as to ensure that the revokee is fully apprised of his or her right
to a hearing before school officials .... Consequently, the pro-
cedures set forth by the majority opinion are as vague as the statute
itself." 73
A better solution lies in another state's legislation. In contrast
to West Virginia, Kentucky created a statute entitling the student
to a postsuspension exparte hearing before a district court of record.7 4
The student may appeal to a circuit court.75 Significantly, the Ken-
tucky statute includes a provision declaring that revocation "shall
not be permitted unless the local school district shall operate an
alternative education program approved by the Department of Ed-
ucation designed to meet the learning needs of students who are
unable to succeed in the regular program. ' 76 Justice McHugh praises
Kentucky's appreciation of the "drastic" nature of license revo-
cation and its willingness to employ "every possible means to keep
students in school.1 7
Finally, Justice McHugh addresses Justice Neely's suggestion that
driving is akin to a privilege, rather than a right.73 However, Justice
McHugh asserts that "this fact will not support overlooking the
procedural due process deficiencies" of the statute at issue.7 9 In sup-
port of his conclusion, Justice McHugh recognizes that "the United
States Supreme Court has articulated the view that before a driver[']s
72. Id.
73. Id. at 454 n.2.
74. Id. at 454.
75. Id. at 455.
76. Id. at 455 n.3 (quoting Ky. REa. STAT. ANN. § 159.051(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 451.
79. Id. at 455.
11
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license may even be suspended, procedural due process is required.
In so holding, the Supreme Court does not differentiate student
drivers under the age of eighteen from other drivers."80 Justice
McHugh concludes that procedural due process requires a prerev-
ocation hearing to examine the circumstances of the student's with-
drawal. 81
2. The Statute's Violation of the "Void for Vagueness"
Doctrine
Citing prior decisions of the court 2 and American Jurispru-
dence,83 Justice McHugh asserts that the vagueness doctrine exists
along a continuum: one end concerns economic matters and de-
mands less specificity, while the other end deals with more significant
matters (such as criminal penalties) and demands more specificity. s4
Thus, the revocation provision "would be subject to more scrutiny
under the vagueness doctrine than a statute involving economic mat-
ters, as the object of the statute in this case is to revoke a driver[']s
license."8 5 Upon such close scrutiny, Justice McHugh discovers three
ways in which the statute violates the vagueness doctrine.
First, the phrase "circumstances beyond the control" of the stu-
dent "is not defined by the statute nor are there any guidelines which
the superintendent may follow in determining whether a student's
withdrawal is due to circumstances beyond his or her control." 8 6
Yet if the student withdraws because of circumstances beyond her
control, the school official exempts her from the statute's appli-
cation.87 As a result of its determinative effect, this passage requires
further definition to guide the school superintendent in her revo-
cation decision.88 Second, the statute neglects the situation where the
DMV suspends the license of a student who, later, cannot return
80. Id. (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 455 (citing Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling wholesale Grocery Co., 328
S.E.2d 144 fV. Va. 1984); State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538 (%V. Va. 1974)).
83. Id. (citing 16A AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 818 (1979)).
84. Id. at 455-56.
85. Id. at 456.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
[Vol. 94
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to school due to circumstances beyond her control . 9 Third, the stat-
ute demands that the school official notify the DMV each time a
student withdraws, regardless of whether that student possesses a
license.9 This requires the DMV to figure out to whom the statute
applies.91 Accordingly, the statute falls short of the demands placed
on it by the vagueness doctrine and should be declared void.92
As a consequence of not providing a hearing before revocation
and failing to define "circumstances beyond the control" of the
student, the statute "does not pass constitutional muster." 93 This
constitutional failure demands that the statute be proclaimed void.94
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSE
REVOCATION: RELEVANT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
The Fourteenth Amendment declares that "[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 95
Consequently, United States Supreme Court decisions control state
law issues invoking the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
Procedural due process considerations involve determinations of (1)
whether a constitutionally protected interest exists, 96 and (2) what
type of process must be provided.Y In Bell v. Burson,98 the United
States Supreme Court established that a driver's license, as an en-
titlement, merits procedural due process protection. In two subse-
quent opinions, Dixon v. Love and Mackey v. Montrym, °° the
Court applied the following guidelines to determine the kind of pro-
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. GmRum GuNrmm, CONSTrTmmoNAL LAw 567 (1lth ed. 1985).
97. Id. at 584.
98. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
99. 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977).
100. 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
13
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cess required: the private interest involved, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation, and the state or government interest. Application of
these principles to Mr. Means' case and the West Virginia statute
reveals the cogency of Justice McHugh's dissent.
A. Bell v. Burson10 l
Georgia had enacted a Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
requiring an uninsured motorist to post a bond for damages when
requested by the parties following an accident. 0 2 Failure to do so
resulted in suspension of the driver's license and registration.0 3 The
Department of Public Safety (DPS) provided a hearing before sus-
pension took place. 1° However, the hearing barred any discussion
of the driver's fault or liability.10 5 The petitioner, Mr. Bell,1°6 argued
to the Georgia Court of Appeals that the Act's failure to supply a
hearing on the issue of fault violated the due process clause.1t 7 In
response, the court maintained that '[f]ault' or 'innocence' are
completely irrelevant factors."'0 8 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme
Court denied review./°9
101. Bell, 402 U.S. 535.
102. Id. at 535-36.
103. Id. at 536.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Mr. Bell, a minister, routinely drove to three communities in Georgia as part of his clerical
duties. One Sunday, a five-year-old child rode her bicycle into Mr. Bell's car, resulting in an accident.
Reporting the accident to the DPS Director, the child's parents demanded $5,000 worth of damages
for their daughter's injuries. In turn, the Director notified Mr. Bell that if he was not insured, he
must either (1) put up a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 (2) show a notarized release from
liability along with proof of future financial responsibility, or (3) suffer suspension of his driver's
license and registration. At this point, Mr. Bell asked for a hearing in order to demonstrate that he
was not at fault, and that he would be substantially limited in the performance of his professional
duties by such revocation. The Director replied that he had scheduled a hearing but that only these
issues would be considered: "(a) was the petitioner or his vehicle involved in the accident; (b) has
petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or (c) does petitioner come within
any of the exceptions of the Law." GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-602 (1958). Prohibiting Mr. Bell's attempt
to introduce evidence on liability, the Director found that Mr. Bell did not fall under any of the
exceptions and gave him 30 days to satisfy the statute's security provisions or have his license revoked.
Upon appeal de novo to the Superior Court, the court considered Mr. Bell's evidence on fault.
Finding him to be free from liability, the court ruled that Mr. Bell's license not be suspended until
a personal injury suit was filed. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 537-38 (1971).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 536-37.
109. Id. at 537.
[V/ol. 94
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In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, 110 Justice Bren-
nan addresses two issues. First, he considers whether a driver's i-
cense represents an entitlement protected by procedural due process."'
Second, Justice Brennan inquires into the type of hearing required.'1 2
This inquiry further splits off into contemplation of the subject mat-
ter of the hearing 13 and whether the hearing should take place before
or after suspension of the license." 4
Justice Brennan begins with the observation that the statute would
not have violated due process if it had prohibited the issuance of
licenses to uninsured drivers." 5 However,
[o]nce licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may
become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such
cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.' '6
Furthermore, procedural due process is required "whether the en-
titlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privilege.""1 17
The second part of the opinion addresses the kind of procedural
due process required. Procedures vary according to the type of en-
titlement involved."1 In Mr. Bell's case, the hearing on the issue of
fault does not require full adjudication because "[t]hat adjudication
can only be made in litigation between the parties involved in the
accident.""19 Further, the subject of the hearing may be confined
to the question of "whether there is a reasonable possibility of
judgements in the amounts claimed being rendered against the li-
censee," since the sole purpose of the statute is to procure security
for such judgements.12
110. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court: Chief Justice Burger, Justice Black
and Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.
111. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 541.
114. Id. at 542.
115. Id. at 539.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 540.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Yet Georgia argued that a fault inquiry hearing was unnecessary
because fault was "irrelevant to the statutory scheme.' 12' Justice
Brennan responded by pointing out several occasions where liability
"plays a crucial role" in the Act,' 2 and "[s]ince the statutory scheme
[made] liability an important factor in the State's determination to
deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently
with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior
hearing.' ' 23 Thus, Mr. Bell's hearing violated this standard since it
prohibited deliberation upon the critical element of fault. t24
Lastly, Justice Brennan addresses Georgia's contention that the
hearing on liability does not have to take place before suspension
of the licenses and registration. 25 Rejecting this argument, Justice
Brennan held that, absent an emergency situation, a prerevocation
hearing is an essential requirement of the due process clause . 2 6
B. Dixon v. Love 27
In Dixon, an Illinois statute28 enabled the Secretary of State to
act "without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or
other sufficient evidence" that a person falls into one of eighteen
categories as a result of his driving.129 Prior to revocation, written
notice must be "immediately" provided, although the statute re-
quires no prior hearing.' 30 Further, the Secretary must provide a
"full evidentiary hearing" within twenty days of the licensee's writ-
ten request.' 3' The Secretary's determination may be reviewed by the
Illinois courts. 32 Persons who have suffered a hardship because of
121. Id. at 541.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 542.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
127. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
128. Id. at 107 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. C. 95 1/2, § 6-206(a) (1974)).
129. Conviction of three moving traffic violations within a 12-month period comprises one such
category resulting in suspension. Another arises when an individual "has been suspended thrice within
a 10 year period." Id. at 107-09.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 109-10.
132. Id. at 110.
[Vol. 94
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the license revocation or who require a license for commercial use
may procure a restricted permit. 33
Following the Secretary's revocation of his license, Mr. Love"3
brought an action before the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.1 35 The district court held the statute
unconstitutional, 36 asserting that Bell v. Burson mandates a pre-
revocation hearing.
The Supreme Court, citing Bell v. Burson, begins its analysis by
identifying that "the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation
of a driver's license by the State."' 37 Since Mr. Love did not question
the administrative hearing itself, the only remaining issue concerned
whether due process requires a hearing prior to suspension. Finding
the case akin to Mathews v. Eldridge,1 31 the Court chooses to de-
termine the case before it along the same guidelines:
[[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires con-
sideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.1 9
In terms of the first Eldridge factor, the Court compares the
private interest represented by a driver's license with that represented
by social security payments dealt with in Eldridge.1 4 On one hand,
a driver's license involves a less important private interest than social
133. Id.
134. In the course of his employment as a truck-driver, appellee Mr. Love acquired the following
violations: (1) license suspension in 1969 for three convictions within a 12-month period, (2) a sub-
sequent suspension in 1970 for driving with a suspended license, (3) two convictions for speeding in
1974, and (4) a third citation for speeding in February of 1975. Mr. Love was informed on March
27 that his license would be suspended if he was convicted of the third violation. The conviction
took place on March 31, and Mr. Love received a notice on June 3 that suspension would occur on
June 6. Id. at 110-11.
135. Id. at I11.
136. Id. at 111-12.
137. Id. at 112.
138. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
139. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 319).
140, Id. at 113.
17
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security benefits because recipients of benefits use them for subsis-
tence.' 41 On the other hand, a driver's license may involve a greater
private interest than social security benefits because a licensee cannot
be compensated for the period of suspension in the manner a social
security recipient can be paid retroactively. 42 However, in light of
the restricted permit provision for hardship and commercial use, the
Court holds that "something less than an evidentiary hearing is suf-
ficient prior to adverse administrative action" for the private interest
in this case. 143
Second, the absence of a prior hearing creates no great risk of
an erroneous deprivation, because the determinations of whether to
revoke are basically automatic. 44 Mr. Love had already been af-
forded a full judicial hearing for all his traffic convictions. 45 There-
fore, the Court "conclude[s] that requiring additional procedures
would be unlikely to have significant value in reducing the number
of erroneous deprivations.'"46
Third, a pretermination hearing would invite affected persons to
delay, creating an obstacle to administrative efficiency.1 47 More im-
portantly, however, the public interest in safety mandates the im-
mediate removal of the danger represented by the repeatedly convicted
driver. 148 "This factor fully distinguishes Bell v. Burson149 . . . where
the 'only purpose' of the Georgia statute there under consideration
was 'to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against
the licensee resulting from the accident."' 50
In conclusion, the Court holds that the substantial public inter-
ests involved allows the state to make an initial decision without
providing a hearing.'5'
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 114.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
150. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977).
151. Id. at 115.
[Vol. 94
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C. Mackey v. Montrym 52
The Massachusetts implied consent law presumes that any person
driving on Massachusetts roads consents to a breath-analysis test
upon arrest for drunken driving. 53 Although the arrested person may
refuse the test, the commonwealth will suspend her license for ninety
days for doing so.' 54 Subsequent to Mr. Montrym's license
suspension5 5 under the implied consent statute, he filed suit in United
States District Court charging that the statute was unconstitu-
tional.1 56 The district court, citing Bell v. Burson, agreed with Mr.
Montrym that due process required a presuspension hearing. 5 7
In its opinion, the Supreme Court applies the three-factor bal-
ancing test of Eldridge examining the private interest involved, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation, and the government interest at
issue.15 8 As in Love, the private interest consists of the continued
152. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
153. Justice Burger provides the following portion of MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f):
Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] way ... shall be deemed to have
consented to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath in the event that he is
arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor....
If the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis, after having been informed
that his license ... to operate motor vehicles ... in the commonwealth shall be suspended
for a period of ninety days for such refusal, no such test or analysis shall be made, but
the police officer before whom such refusal was made shall immediately prepare a written
report of such refusal.
Montrym, 443 U.S. at 3-4 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN, ch. 90, § 24(1)(t) (West Supp. 1979))
(alternation in original).
154. Id., at 3-4.
155. On May 15, 1976, a police officer arrested Mr. Montrym for driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor at the site of Mr. Montryn's automobile accident. After being taken to the
police station, Mr. Montrym refused to take a breath-analysis test. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Montrym
changed his mind and sought to take the test. Following the statute's demand that an immediate
report of the refusal be made, the police officer denied the request. The officer then filed his report
of Mr. Montrym's refusal with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.
On June 2, a state court dismissed Mr. Montrym's driving under the influence charge, apparently
because the police had failed to honor Mr. Montrym's second request for the breath-analysis test.
Although Mr. Montrym's lawyer notified the Registrar of this dismissal, the Registrar suspended Mr.
Montrym's license because he had no authority to do otherwise. He also informed Mr. Montrym of
his right to appeal the suspension. Although a hearing before the Registrar was available, Mr. Montrym
chose instead to appeal to the Board of Appeal. However, after threatening to sue the Registrar, Mr.
Montrym brought suit in United States District Court, abandoning his administrative appeal. Id. at
4-8.
156. Id. at 8.
157. Id. at 9.
158. Id. at 10.
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use of a driver's license. 159 Although noting the interest to be "sub-
stantial" because of the inability to "make whole" a driver with
an erroneously suspended license, the Court maintains that the in-
terest here is less weighty than in Love, because here the maximum
suspension duration is ninety days and in Love it was one year.'1°
Moreover, the Court declares that the timing of the postsuspension
hearing comprises one of the most important considerations. 161 In
Love, a postsuspension hearing need not be scheduled until twenty
days after the request was made; the restricted permit for hardship
or commercial use offsets the harshness of this delay. 62 In contrast,
the Massachusetts statute provides for an immediate postsuspension
hearing. 163 Therefore, "[n]either the nature nor the weight of the
private interest involved in this case compels a result contrary to
that reached in Love."'' 64
Concerning the erroneous deprivation prong of the Eldridge test,
the Supreme Court first asserts that the risk of an erroneous re-
porting of the facts by the police officer "seems insubstantial.' 1 65
Second, factual disputes rarely arise, as indicated by Montrym itself:
Mr. Montrym's complaint involved the legal, rather than factual,
question of whether the policeman's refusal to administer a breath-
analysis test invalidated Mr. Montrym's suspension.'" Third, even
when factual disputes occur, the risk of error is not substantial enough
to warrant delay of suspension 67 Fourth, the nonevidentiary pre-
suspension hearing suggested by the district court would only correct
clerical errors which, if material, the Registrar previously would have
noticed.' 8 Fifth, although a presuspension evidentiary hearing might
reveal factual disputes between the driver and officer, "the Registrar
is not in a position to make an informed-probable cause determi-
159. Id. at 11.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 14.
166. Id. at 14-15.
167. Id. at 15.
168. Id. at 16.
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nation or exercise of discretion prior to an evidentiary hearing."1 69
Therefore, a presuspension hearing would not "materially enhance"
reliability.170
Finally, as in Love, the significant governmental interest involved
concerns public safety, "fully distinguish[ing] this case from Bell v.
Burson.' ' 171 The summary suspension serves this public interest by:
(1) deterring intoxicated driving, (2) providing an incentive to take
the breath-analysis test so that reliable evidence for criminal pro-
secutions may be procured, and (3) ridding the highways of a sig-
nificant hazard. 17 2 Furthermore, drivers would utilize a presuspension
hearing as a means of delay, placing a significant fiscal and ad-
ministrative burden on Massachusetts. 173
In sum, the Court rules that highway safety constitutes a weighty
governmental interest justifying license suspension without a hearing,
as long as a hearing is promptly provided following suspension.1 74
D. Means in the Face of Precedent
Although the majority and dissenting opinions of Means touched
on some of the constitutional requirements addressed by the United
States Supreme Court's decisions, a thorough discussion of how these
decisions apply to the Means case is essential to understanding the
appropriateness of that decision.
1. Application of the Bell Principles to Means
In Bell, Justice Brennan holds that (1) the subject matter of the
hearing must be comprised of important statutory elements, 175 and
(2) notice and an opportunity for a hearing must be given prior to
termination. 176 Analyzing Means in the context of these mandates
reveals the West Virginia statute to be deficient in both areas.
169. Id. at 16-17.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 18.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 19.
175. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971).
176. Id. at 542.
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In both Bell and Means, the state failed to allow the individuals
to address issues critically significant (because these issues deter-
mined whether revocation would occur). In Bell, the hearing official
refused to let Mr. Bell introduce evidence of liability; 77 in Means,
Mr. Means was not allowed to address the circumstances of his
withdrawal. 178 Yet Justice Brennan declared that "[s]ince the stat-
utory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's de-
termination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may
not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that
factor in its prior hearing." 179 Thus, since the West Virginia statute
makes "circumstances beyond the control" of the student a signif-
icant element, it cannot be excluded from consideration.
In another relevant portion of his opinion, Justice Brennan de-
clares that absent an emergency circumstance, due process mandates
that the state provide "notice and opportunity for hearing appro-
priate to the nature of the case" prior to revocation.w° In reference
to Means, West Virginia Code Section 18-8-11 provides that the
DMV will give the student a thirty-day notice of suspension. 8 ' How-
ever, West Virginia Code Section 17B-3-6(10) provides for only a
postsuspension hearing where a licensee "[ius under the age of eight-
een and has withdrawn either voluntarily or involuntarily from a
secondary school."'8 2 Since the interest involved in Means is the
same as in Bell, a presuspension hearing must occur. However, the
subsequent decisions of Love and Montrym further refine timing
considerations.
Thus, the West Virginia statute violates procedural due process
by failing to provide a hearing addressing the circumstances of the
student's withdrawal. The Bell decision additionally represents the
proposition that procedural due process requires a presuspension
hearing in license revocation cases.
177. Id. at 538.
178. Means v. Sidiropolls, 401 S.E.2d 447, 449 (W. Va. 1990).
179. Bell, 402 U.S. at 541.
180. Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950)).
181. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
182. W. VA. CODE § 17B-3-6(10) (1991).
[Vol. 94
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2. Application of the Love Principles to Means
Regarding the first element of the Eldridge test used by the Love
Court, the affected private interest, 183 one major difference between
the Illinois statute discussed in Love and the West Virginia statute
must be addressed. On one hand, the Love statute contains a pro-
vision whereby an individual suffering a hardship or requiring a
license for commercial use can obtain a restricted permit.1 84 On the
other hand, the West Virginia statute, 185 although exempting those
students who withdraw due to circumstances beyond their control,
fails to provide restricted permits or specifically identify a "hard-
ship" provision. Consequently, the West Virginia statute adversely
affects the private interest more dramatically than does the Illinois
statute.
Furthermore, the second factor, the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation,'86 involves different elements here than in the Illinois stat-
ute. In Love, little risk of an erroneous deprivation existed because
revocation decisions were primarily automatic, based on prior viol-
ations. 8 7 In contrast, the risk of an erroneous deprivation in Means
is greater because the decision to revoke depends on the discretion
of one person - the school district superintendent.1 88 Moreover,
discrepancies may arise between the student's and superintendent's
factual presentations that may increase the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation. Finally, an erroneous deprivation may occur as a result of
a misinterpretation of the phrase, "circumstances beyond the con-
trol" of the student.
The third factor consists of the governmental interest involved. 89
In Love, the governmental interest in public safety mandated the
immediate removal of the repeatedly convicted driver from the
road. 9° Here, however, no such imminence exists; possession of driv-
183. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
184. Id. at 110.
185. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
186. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112-13 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
187. Id. at 113.
188. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
189. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
190. Id. at 114.
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ers' licenses by high school dropouts poses no threat to public safety.
Although encouraging students to continue their education is laud-
able in purpose, it certainly weighs less in terms of importance than
public highway safety,
The net result of balancing these three factors demonstrates that
the private interest here deserves greater procedural due process pro-
tection than it did in Love. Not only does the Means private interest
lack the protection of a restricted permit and a hardship provision, 191
the governmental interest of indirectly encouraging school atten-
dance demands less consideration than Love's governmental interest
in public safety.' 9 Moreover, Means involves a greater risk that a
student will be erroneously deprived of her driver's license than the
analogous risk in Love, where revocation decisions were mainly au-
tomatic. 193
3. Application of the Montrym Principles to Means
As in Love, the Montrym Court employed the Eldridge balancing
test. 194Comparison of the relative private interests reveals the Means
interest to be most affected, because the possible suspension period
is longer than in Montrym and Love. 95 Although the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of a driver's license appears equal in Montrym
and Means, the Montrym governmental interest of public safety
overshadows the Means governmental interest of school atten-
dance. 196
The Montrym Court asserted that the private interest there, in-
volving a maximum suspension period of ninety days, was less than
in Love, in which the uppermost revocation period was one year. 97
These periods pale by comparison, however, to the two-year sus-
191. Id. at 110.
192. Id. at 114.
193. Id. at 113.
194. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
195. Id. at 11-12.
196. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 450 (%V. Va. 1990).
197. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 11-12.
[Vol. 94
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pension period in Means.19 Of the statutes represented in these cases,
the West Virginia statute yields the greatest penalty. Therefore, the
private interest here outweighs the private interests in either Love
or Montrym.
Looking to the second portion of the Eldridge test, an approx-
imately equal risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest
exists here as in Montrym. In both Montrym and Means, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation derives from (1) the possibility of a
discrepancy between the factual accounts of the driver and official
involved, and (2) the discretionary nature of the decision (in Mon-
trym, the police officer must judge whether the driver appears in-
toxicated; 199 in Means, the school official must determine if
withdrawal was beyond the student's control).200
However, the third factor, the governmental interest, is greater
in both Montrym and Love than here. Public safety and the im-
portance of immediate action in eradicating the danger represented
by either intoxicated 2°! or unsafe drivers2 2 outweighs the Means gov-
ernmental interest of encouraging school attendance. 203
In conclusion, as demonstrated by the above analysis, greater
procedural due process protection must be conferred on a licensee
under the West Virginia statute than under the analogous statutes
in Montrym and Love.
4. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions Considered in
Light of These Applications
The United States Supreme Court decisions, in sum, have held
that procedural due process requires, at a minimum, that the statute
provides for a hearing that addresses the most important aspects of
the statute that affect the private interest involved. Further, specific
198. Under W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988), if a student drops out upon her sixteenth birthday
(permitted under W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Supp. 1991)) and fails to return, her license would be
suspended for two years.
199. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 14 (1979).
200. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
201. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 18.
202. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977).
203. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 450 (W. Va. 1990).
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hardship provisions, such as those in Love, ensure the satisfaction
of procedural due process. Finally, the amount of procedural due
process protection that the private interest demands relates directly
to how much the governmental interest affects it, as well as the
likelihood of the private interest being erroneously deprived. These
factors take on greater significance in the West Virginia statute -
where the private interest is greater and the public interest less -
than.in either of the statutes discussed in Love or Montrym.
In the majority opinion, Justice Neely asserts that (1) the hearing
should be conducted by a school official, 2°4 (2) the DMV should
inform the student of her right to a hearing before the appropriate
school official, 2°5 and (3) "the words 'circumstances beyond their
control' create a quite specific standard.'"'2 In terms of the first
assertion, the real issue concerns the subject matter of the hearing.
The student must be heard on the question of the circumstances of
her withdrawal since this determines whether revocation will occur.
Justice Neely's point that the hearing should be held by the school
superintendentw follows logically from the student's need to be heard
on the circumstances of her withdrawal; clearly, the student whose
license has been revoked should be able to address the person who
determined the nature of her withdrawal. Regarding Justice Neely's
second element, without question the DMV must inform the student
of her right to a hearing before a school official which deals with
the circumstances of withdrawal. But, in addition, the student's right
to a hearing on the subject of circumstances beyond her control
should be included in the statute. Justice Brennan first states this
principle - that the licensee be heard on the issue determining rev-
ocation - in Bell. °8 In the subsequent decisions of Love and Mon-
trym, both of the statutes that the Court upholds also provide for
substantive considerations. 2°9
204. Id. at 450.
205. Id. at 453.
206. Id. at 451.
207. Id. at 450.
208. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971).
209. In Love, the statute affords the licensee a full evidentiary hearing. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.
105, 109 (1977). In Montrym, the statute provides the licensee an opportunity to be heard on the
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In terms of the third element, in addition to stating that "the
words 'circumstances beyond their control' create a quite specific
standard," Justice Neely holds that further definitions "are use-
less."210 Yet Justice Neely himself provided several examples which
help elucidate the meaning of these words. 21' If West Virginia placed
defining terms in the statute, as Illinois did in Love, the statute's
constitutionality would be safeguarded.
Justice McHugh, in the dissenting opinion, finds the statute to
be unconstitutional, as it fails to: (1) clearly define "circumstances
beyond the control" of the student, which due process requires be-
cause of its determinative effect,212 and (2) provide the student with
an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the circumstances of her
withdrawal 13 (3) prior to revocation of her driver's license.21 4 First,
although failure to clearly define "circumstances beyond the con-
trol" of the student will not necessarily violate due process, the
inclusion of further defining terms can only help ensure the statute's
compliance with procedural due process. Other states enacted similar
statutes providing specific mention of financial hardship as a reason
for exempting the student from the statute's effects. 215
Second, Justice McHugh correctly identifies that consideration
of the circumstances of the student's withdrawal needs to take place
three major elements of the statute: "(1) did the police officer have reasonable grounds to believe
that such person had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
upon any [public] way ... (2) was such person placed under arrest, and (3) did such person refuse
to submit to such test or analysis." Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (1979) (alteration in
original).
210. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 451 n.1 (W. Va. 1990).
211. Justice Neely provided the following several examples: "children who withdraw from school
because they are needed to support their families; children who withdraw from school because of
physical disabilities that preclude further attendance between the ages of sixteen and eighteen; and,
children who withdraw from school because both the children and the schools agree that further
attendance will be less beneficial than on-the-job training or some other program of personal de-
velopment." Id. at 451.
212. Id. at 456 (McHugh, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 454.
214. Id. at 455.
215. The four states whose statutes contain hardship provisions are Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-18-222 (Supp. 1990-91)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.0601 (West Supp. 1991)), Kentucky (KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.051 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990)), and Ohio (OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4507.061 (Anderson Supp. 1990)).
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at the hearing. 2 6 As noted above, Justice Brennan first articulates
this principle in Bell.217 Third, the issue of whether the hearing must
occur prior to suspension hovers on the periphery of a more central
point: that the private interest in Means deserves greater procedural
due process protection than the skeletal postrevocation hearing af-
forded by West Virginia. Greater protection could be provided either
by a presuspension hearing or a full evidentiary, postsuspension
hearing. Although in Bell the Court considered a pretermination
hearing essential, 2 8 in the later decisions of Love2 9 and Montrym220
the Court held post-termination hearings to be acceptable. Yet in
both Love and Montrym, the private interests were less and the
governmental interests greater than in Means. Further, the post-
suspension hearings discussed in Love and Montrym provide greater
procedural due process protection of the private interest than does
the West Virginia statute. 2 Therefore, since the private interest here
deserves more procedural due process protection, the private interest
mandates that the state supply either a presuspension hearing or a
posttermination hearing involving some elevated form of judicial or
administrative process.
Thus, although Justice Neely attempts to judicially constitution-
alize the statute by ruling that the hearing should be conducted be-
fore a school official, his efforts fall short of the precedential mandate
that the statute specifically identify the student's right to a hearing
on the circumstances of her withdrawal. Justice McHugh, on the
other hand, accurately asserts that the statute's failure to provide
a hearing on the reasons for withdrawal and the inadequacy of the
postrevocation hearing render the statute unconstitutional. Accord-
ingly, the West Virginia legislature should amend the statute to in-
clude identification of a hearing for consideration of circumstances
216. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 454 (W. Va. 1990).
217. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971).
218. Id. at 542.
219. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977).
220. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
221. The Illinois statute in Love affords the licensee a full evidentiary hearing. Dixon, 431 U.S.
at 109. The Massachusetts statute in Montrym makes available to the revokee a hearing before the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles which may be appealed to the Board of Appeal, which, in turn, is subject
to judicial review. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 6 n.4, 7.
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beyond the control of the student. Furthermore, the legislature must
convert the existing postrevocation hearing into either a presuspen-
sion hearing or some heightened judicial or administrative hearing
to shelter the vulnerable private interest at stake. Finally, the phrase
"circumstances beyond the control" of the student should be further
defined by a hardship provision to ensure the statute's constitu-
tionality.
V. SIMILAR STATUTES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A total of eleven states, 222 including West Virginia, have enacted
laws which in some way condition driver's license possession on
school attendance. Of these, three states 23 need not address pro-
cedural due process concerns because their statutes do not include
suspension provisions. All of the remaining states, with the exception
of Wisconsin, hold the private interest in greater regard than West
Virginia.
The statutes of Indiana,224 Texas,2  and Virginia226 require school
attendance before a student can obtain a license. However, none of
these statutes contain revocation provisions. Consequently, these
states need not be concerned about violating procedural due process.
Although a state must provide due process when removing an ex-
isting entitlement, it may withhold an entitlement without doing so. 227
These states choose, nevertheless, to provide the minor who has been
denied a license with the opportunity to be heard. 228
222. Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia and Wisconsin. Mississippi also enacted a statute conditioning the possession of a driver's
license on high school attendance, scheduled to become effective on July 1, 1990. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-1-54 (Supp. 1990). However, the state conditioned the statute's implementation on the legislature
passing a resolution which dedicated sufficient funds to such implementation. As a consequence of
the funds not being provided, the statute never became effective. The preceding information was
provided, in part, by a state official in Mississippi. Telephone Interview with T.C. Ward, Director
of Legislative Services for the State Senate of Mississippi (Sept. 12, 1991).
223. Indiana, Texas, and Virginia.
224. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-3-17.2 (West Supp. 1991).
225. TEX. REv. Civ. STAr. ANN. art. 6687b sec. 7 (West Supp. 1991).
226. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-334 (Michie Supp. 1991).
227. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
228. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-3-17.2 (West Supp. 1991); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b
sec. 31 (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-321 (Michie Supp. 1991).
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A fourth state differing substantially from the others, Wisconsin,
requires school attendance until the age of eighteen. 229 Failure to
comply with the compulsory attendance law may lead to license sus-
pension. 2 ° Wisconsin's statute does not mention the right to a hear-
ing.
TennesseeP1 has enacted a statute similar to West Virginia's. 232
Both statutes exempt a student who has withdrawn "due to cir-
cumstances beyond his or her control." '1 33 Yet, ironically, neither
state permits discussion of why the student withdrew from school
at the hearing they provide. 234 However, Tennessee provides that the
licensee's case will be heard and decided prior to revocation if the
licensee requests an administrative review within fifteen days after
being notified of revocation.23 5
Louisiana236 also passed a statute much like West Virginia's which
excuses the student from the statutory penalty when withdrawal is
"due to circumstances deemed acceptable. ' '12 7 Yet Louisiana affords
the minor heightened due process protection by providing her with
a postsuspension hearing before the Department of Public Safety
and Corrections appealable to a court. 238 Arkansas239 and Florida4
both provide for a presuspension hearing in their statutes, as well
as an exception for hardship. The statutes of Kentucky241 and Ohio u2
also contain hardship provisions. Kentucky makes available a post-
suspension full judicial hearing in district court with a right to appeal
in circuit court;2 3 Ohio provides for a presuspension hearing with
229. Vis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (,Vest 1991).
230. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.163 (Vest 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.342 (West Supp. 1991).
231. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3017 (1990).
232. W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
233. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3017 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (1988).
234. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-511 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 17B-3-6 (1991).
235. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-511 (Supp. 1991).
236. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:431 (West Supp. 1991).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-222 (Michie Supp. 1991).
240. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.0601 (West Supp. 1991).
241. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.051 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
242. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4507.061 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
243. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.051 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
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the school s'uperintendent and a postsuspension hearing before the
juvenile court. 244
Thus, of all the state statutes' invoking procedural due process
protection for an aggrieved individual, West Virginia provides the
least procedural due process protection. West Virginia must include
a hearing on the circumstances of a student's withdrawal and a
presuspension or heightened postsuspension hearing in its statute to
rise to the constitutional level of other states.
VI. THE RUTGERS RiEPORT245
David J. Armoru" and Jackson Toby24 7 conducted a study of
West Virginia Code Section 18-8-11 in order to determine its effi-
cacy. The report utilizes data on West Virginia dropouts that focuses
on the period from 1984 to 1990.24 In carrying out this analysis,
Armor and Toby determined, and subsequently tested, key as-
sumptions underlying the statute.24 9 Further, they formulated two
significant research questions: (1) the effect of the statute on dropout
rates, and (2) the effectiveness and impact of enforcement. 250 Finally,
the researchers answered these questions and determined their causes.
Utilizing data obtained primarily from the West Virginia De-
partment of Education and the DMV, 251 Armor and Toby conducted
a state-wide inquiry. The researchers utilized three bases of analysis:
raw numbers, state rates, and annual rates. All three showed similar
patterns. 2 The analysis indicates that between 1984-85 and 1986-87
the dropout figure decreased by over 600.23 In 1988-89, the number
of dropouts fell again by almost 200 students. 254 However, the re-
244. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4507.061 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
245. David J. Armor & Jackson Toby, The West Virginia Driver's License Law For Dropouts
(March 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Rutgers University).
246. David J. Armor is a Visiting Professor at Rutgers University.
247. Jackson Toby is a Professor of Sociology at Rutgers University.
248. Armor & Toby, supra note 245, at 14.
249. Id. at 7-8.
250. Id. at 8.
251. Id. at 10.
252. Id. at 13.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 17-18.
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searchers believed that the 1988-89 decline in the number of dropouts
was caused not by the passing of the statute in 1988, but rather by
a trend already in existence. 255 Further reinforcement for this theory
derives from the 1989-90 increase in the dropout number by 200.256
Concerned that the 1989-90 rise in the dropout population might
indicate that the law had "an adverse impact on the dropout
process," Armor and Toby researched the possibility that other fac-
tors caused the increase .2 7 One possibility involved changing trends
in dropout-correlated variables such as more students riding buses,
lower academic achievement scores, higher poverty levels, higher pu-
pil-teacher ratios, and the provision of fewer special education serv-
ices.258 This research revealed that these trends should actually have
produced a reduction, rather than an increase, in dropout rates.
25 9
Finally, after speaking with state and local officials about the 1989-
90 increase, Armor and Toby posited that the statute and its re-
porting procedures caused an increase in careful reporting, resulting
in more students recorded as having withdrawn from school.
26°
To analyze the statute in reference to this data, Armor and Toby
outlined three assumptions underlying the statute.261 First, a sub-
stantial portion of sixteen and seventeen year-old dropouts desire
possession of driver's licenses. 262 Second, successful enforcement must
occur. 263 Third, those students hoping to obtain a driver's license
would choose possession of a license and staying in school over
dropping out and forfeiting their license. 264
In testing these assumptions, the researchers discovered the first
and third to be largely invalid. Regarding the first assumption, ap-
proximately eighty percent of reported dropouts either (a) do not
possess licenses, or (b) are beyond the age of eighteen and, therefore,
255. Id. at 17.
256. Id. at 13.
257. Id. at 17.
258. Id. at 17-18.
259. Id. at 18.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 7-8.
262. Id. at 7.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 7-8.
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unaffected by the statute. 265 On the other hand, enforcement has
been "reasonably effective. ' 26 The third assumption, however,
proved untrue; only twenty-eight percent of those students whose
licenses were suspended during the first two years since the statute's
enactment went back to school or pursued a GED course. 267
Armor and Toby answered the first research question by stating
that
the new law has not lowered dropout rates state-wide, at least during this initial
two year period .... The reasons are, simply, that too many dropouts either (1)
do not have driver's licenses, (2) are 18 or over, or (3) place too little value on
licenses compared to the perceived burden of remaining in school.-
Responding to the second research question, the researchers asserted
that efficient enforcement of the law has little impact because the
statute applies to only a limited portion of the dropout population. 269
In conclusion, the researchers warn that "even if small effects
can be demonstrated, they will require significant administrative and
law enforcement efforts from agencies that may well already be over-
burdened .... The reduction in dropout rates must be compared
to the cost of prevention.''270
VII. CONCLUSION
Society pays dearly for dropouts because of their high unem-
ployment rate and lower earning power. Although laudable in its
intent to remedy this problem, the West Virginia statute encounters
obstacles in terms of constitutionality and effectiveness.
Regarding constitutionality, the statute's most glaring deficiency
concerns its failure to specify the student's right to a hearing at
which the circumstances of her withdrawal will be considered. Fur-
ther, although the United States Supreme Court has upheld post-
suspension hearings in license revocation statutes, the private interest
265. Id. at 24.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 24-25.
268. Id. at 25.
269. Id. at 16.
270. Id. at 26.
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involved here is greater in relationship to the public interest than
in those cases. As a result, the bare-boned post-termination hearing
offered by West Virginia fails to constitutionally protect the fragile
private interest. To protect this private interest from infringement
by governmental directives, the state must supply the licensee with
either a presuspension hearing or some elevated judicial or admin-
istrative process following suspension. Finally, inclusion of a hard-
ship provision will further protect the important private interest at
stake.
Other jurisdictions27' have followed West Virginia's example in
seeking to address the dropout problem through legislation which
conditions possession of a driver's license on school attendance. Of
the eight states2 72 whose statutes contain suspension clauses, West
Virginia protects the private interest less than all but Wisconsin. The
other six states27" offer the licensee enhanced due process protection
with presuspension hearings or postsuspension hearings with the right
of appeal. In an effort to further shield the private interest, four
state statutes274 contain hardship provisions.
In addition to constitutional weakness, the statute bears the un-
fortunate stamp of ineffectiveness. As demonstrated by the Rutgers
Report, the statute has not decreased the number of dropouts pri-
marily because (1) it affects too small a portion of the dropout
population, and (2) of those affected, many still choose withdrawal
over continued attendance, even if their licenses are suspended. Fi-
nally, a balancing of the administrative cost of the statute against
its utility suggests that the statute is not cost-effective.
Unquestionably, dropouts represent a major concern to society.
In resolving this problem, however, state government must be ever-
vigilant to constitutionally protect the private interest of the indi-
vidual. Furthermore, if the financial burden imposed by the state's
271. Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
272. Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
273. Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, and Tennessee.
274. Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, and Ohio.
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administrative cost continues to outweigh the yet to be demonstrated
benefit of fewer dropouts, West Virginia should abandon the current
statutory solution.
Mark J. Merrill
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